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This paper applies economic analysis to two puzzling
features of intellectual property litigation over the past twenty-
five years or so. One is that there has been little increase in
intellectual property litigation while, at the same time, there has
been rapid growth in both the output and legal protection of
intellectual property.! The other is that the percentage of
intellectual property cases terminated by trial has fallen sharply
from approximately 3.5% to 1.5% during the 1978 to 2000 period.
These observations are mirrored in the overall trends in all civil
litigation in the federal courts-terminations have been
relatively flat and trials have declined sharply. This suggests
that there are factors common to both intellectual property and
civil litigation, taken as a whole, which are likely to be important
determinants of intellectual property litigation.
The empirical features of the litigation process itself that
may bear on the observed changes in intellectual property
litigation are also explored in this paper. These include looking at
trademark, copyright, and patent litigation separately and
considering factors such as court delay or the time from filing to
terminating a case, the proportion of trials won by plaintiffs (i.e.,
the win rate), the number of jury and judge trials, and the
respective win rates.
This paper is organized as follows: Part I reviews the
standard economic model of litigation and extends the model to
intellectual property litigation. Not surprisingly, the economic
model predicts that the important determinants of civil litigation
are legal uncertainty, the cost of litigation (including time costs),
the expected judgment from trial, the impact of litigation on the
firm's future profits, and the possibility that the intellectual
property in question will be held invalid. Part II applies the
economic model to data on trademark, copyright, and patent
litigation in the time period from 1978 to 2000. Finally, Part III
summarizes the main findings of the paper.
1. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 4 (2004) (observing empirical evidence on both the increase
in output and legal protection of intellectual property), available at http://aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=985.
2. Refer to Figure 2 infra.
3. In future work, Richard Posner and I plan to analyze the trends in federal
litigation over the past twenty-five years.
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II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF LITIGATION
A. The Basic Model
The standard model of civil litigation assumes that the
parties involved in litigation are rational maximizers. Thus, a
plaintiff or defendant will settle or go to trial depending on the
alternative that yields him the highest expected utility.' To
simplify the analysis, assume further that the parties are risk
neutral; that they agree on the judgment J if the plaintiff wins
at trial; that each party's litigation costs are fixed; each party
bears its own litigation costs (i.e., the American Rule prevails);
and that (unrealistically) settlement and nontrial costs are zero.'Let the plaintiff A's expected value of litigation, VA, equal
VA = pAJ-a (1)
where PA is A's estimate of the probability of winning at
trial and a his costs of pursuing his claim through trial. A will
file a lawsuit against the defendant B only if VA > 0 or, in other
words, if the expected value of litigation is positive.6 Observe that
4. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61,
66 (1971); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-18 (1973). For a simple exposition of the
model (which is sometimes called the mutual optimism or divergent expectation model)
and a discussion of the literature, see chapters nineteen and twenty-one of RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2004) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS]. Although mutual optimism is the best known and most widely used
explanation for why parties go to trial rather than settle, it is not the only explanation.
The other well-known model stresses the role of asymmetric private information in
generating disputes that result in trials.
5. These assumptions are not essential to the main results of the litigation model.
For example, the parties can have different estimates of the judgment or can influence the
probability of winning by varying litigation expenditures without altering the predictions
of the model.
6. If V were negative, A would be better off doing nothing rather than filing a
lawsuit against B. There is, however, a significant amount of literature that tries to
explain the conditions that could lead a rational plaintiff to file a negative expected value
or frivolous lawsuit. Because a rational plaintiff would not pursue his claim through trial,
a negative expected value lawsuit would only be brought for its settlement value.
Rosenberg and Shavell show that this would occur if it is relatively cheap for the plaintiff
to file a claim compared to the cost to the defendant of responding to the suit. See David
Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4-5 (1985). Then A would file a suit knowing that B
would be willing to pay A an amount up to B's response costs (which is assumed to be
greater than A's filing costs) to induce A to drop its suit. Id.
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
VA also represents A's minimum demand to settle before trial.
For example, suppose PA=0.8, J=$100, and a=$10. A's
minimum settlement demand is $70 because a sum of $70 plus
one penny makes A better off compared to the expected value of a
trial.
Let VB denote defendant B's expected loss from A's lawsuit
as in
V, = pJ + b (2)
where PB equals B's estimate of the probability that A will
prevail in a trial and b equals B's litigation costs if the case is
tried. V, also represents B's maximum offer to settle out of
court. If B can settle for a penny less than VA, he expects to be
better off settling than going to trial. The parties will settle
before trial if V, > VA, because both A and B can be better off (in
an expected sense) settling than going to trial. Alternatively, if
VA < VA, a trial will take place.
Rewriting equations (1) and (2) leads the parties to settle
before trial if
a + b > (PA - P )J (3a)
or go to trial if
a + b < (PA -P )J . (3b)
Thus, the necessary but not sufficient conditions for a trial is
that PA > PI or that the parties are mutually optimistic about
their chances of prevailing at trial. The sufficient conditions for a
settlement are that PA < PB or that the parties are mutually
pessimistic or in agreement on A's probability of success at trial
(for then equation (3b) must hold because the right hand side is
negative or zero and litigation costs are positive). In short, if
PA - PB : 0 0, both parties can be made better off by settling
7. The simple model does not distinguish between settling at different points
before or even during trial, nor does it distinguish between different trial outcomes (e.g.,
summary judgment or a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff). For simplicity, therefore,
there are two methods of disposition: pretrial settlements and trials.
8. If settlement costs are positive, a and b would be redefined as the incremental
costs (assumed positive) of going to trial compared to settling increased.
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rather than going to trial, independent of the stakes, litigation
costs, or estimates of the probability of A winning at trial.
B. Trial vs. Settlement
The litigation model has a number of testable implications.
Consider the following:
1. The greater the degree of uncertainty about legal
precedents and the outcome of a trial, the more occasions there
will be for PA > PB and the greater the number of trials that will
take place relative to settlements. Alternatively, if the legal rules
are clear and the parties agree on the relevant precedents and
facts, PA and PB are not likely to differ significantly, so a
settlement will result. Although no direct data on legal
uncertainty exists, the passage of new laws and amendments to
existing laws-particularly if they create new or expanded rights
as opposed to clarifying existing laws and regulations-are likely
to be associated with greater legal activity.
In the area of intellectual property, for example, we expect
that statutory activity will increase the number of lawsuits
because the statutes will cover a greater range of subject matter
and activities. Less obviously, trials should comprise an
increasing proportion of terminations because greater legal
uncertainty, until a sufficient body of precedents interpreting the
new statutes is established, increases the relative number of
disputes in which the degree of mutual optimism, (PA - PB)J, is
greater than the costs of going to trial.
2. An expansion in the level of economic activity associated
with the creation of new intellectual property is likely to increase
the number of potential disputes that have a positive expected
value (see equation (1)) and hence the number of lawsuits and
trials.
3. Litigation costs and the stakes J also play a role in the
settlement or trial decision. The greater the litigation costs-
more correctly, the greater the incremental costs of going to trial
compared to settling-the more likely equation (3a) will hold and
the more likely the parties will settle rather than go to trial. It
also follows that if the parties are mutually optimistic (PA > PB ),
which is a necessary condition for a trial, as J increases-
provided litigation costs don't increase as rapidly-the parties
become more likely to go to trial rather than settle. This occurs
because for a given positive value of PA - PB, the greater J is, the
greater the right-hand side of equations (3a) and (3b) and the
greater the chance the right-hand side will exceed the costs of
litigation. Note that if the parties have identical expectations or
20041 753
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are mutually pessimistic, a settlement will always occur,
regardless of the stakes or litigation costs.9 This implies that (all
other factors constant) an increase in the size of damages and the
value of injunctive remedies in intellectual property litigation
raises the incentive to file lawsuits and creates a greater
percentage of terminations that are resolved by trial.
4. An increase in the waiting time between filing and trial
will lower the value of i in equation (1) by pushing recovery
further into the future and will increase A's costs of going to trial
(a in equation (1)) because the plaintiff will incur legal and other
types of expenditures to keep the case on the docket for a longer
period of time. In short, delay reduces VA , which reduces both the
number of lawsuits filed because a larger fraction of potential
claims will have a negative expected value, and the plaintiffs
minimum settlement amount. On the other hand, B may benefit
from delay because it pushes any judgment B must pay further
into the future, which in turn lowers B's maximum settlement
offer V,. It would appear, therefore, that the net effect of delay on
the likelihood of a settlement is unclear.
There is, however, another consideration that suggests that
delay also imposes costs on the defendant. For example, B may
find it more difficult to exploit the intellectual property to which
he claims rights, or B may have more difficultly raising money in
the capital market until the case is resolved. On net, therefore,
an increase in delay between filing and the completion of a trial
should reduce the proportion of trials.
C. Trial by Judge or by Jury
Because either party can opt for a jury trial, it follows that a
judge or bench trial will take place only if both parties prefer it to
a jury trial. Suppose both parties expect the likelihood of the
plaintiff prevailing at trial to be the same whether it is a judge or
jury trial. Although each party will choose a judge trial about
50% of the time, there is only a 25% chance that both parties will
simultaneously select a judge trial."° We should observe,
9. The analysis is easily modified to allow for risk aversion or risk preference. Risk
aversion means A prefers to settle for a value less than VA (how much less depends on A's
dislike for risk), and B is willing to pay more than V to avoid the risk of litigation. This
widens the settlement range and, all other factors constant, risk makes a settlement more
likely. Alternatively, risk preference narrows the settlement range and makes a
settlement less likely.
10. The plaintiff and defendant can choose between a Judge (J) or Jury (Y) trial. In
probability terms, four distinct outcomes can result: JJ, YY, JY, and YJ. Thus, the
probability of event JJ occurring is 1 out of 4 distinct outcomes, or 25%. See Arnold Kling,
AP Statistics Lectures, at http://www.arnoldkling.conapstats/rules.html (last visited
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therefore, about three times as many jury rather than judge
trials-jury trials will be about 75% of total trials-unless the
cost of jury trials is significantly greater than judge trials.' Now
imagine that one party believes he will do better before a jury
than judge. For example, suppose plaintiffs believe they have a
higher probability of prevailing in front of juries. In those cases,
plaintiffs will always prefer jury trials, and we would not observe
any bench trials. Alternatively, if defendants believe they will do
better in front of juries than judges, defendants will always opt
for juries. In a sample of trials, therefore, we will only observe
judge trials if both parties simultaneously believe they have a
higher probability of winning before a judge than a jury. Stated
differently, A and B will choose a judge trial only if PA in
equation (1) is greater before a judge than a jury and PB in
equation (2) is greater before a jury than a judge; that is, the
plaintiff believes he will do better in front of a judge rather than
a jury and the defendant believes the opposite.
Notice that the model does not predict whether plaintiffs will
win a greater or smaller fraction of cases in front of juries than
judges. To explain, assume for simplicity that plaintiffs win 50%
of their jury trials. These are trials in which the plaintiff, the
defendant, or both prefer a jury to a judge trial. At the same
time, suppose there is another group of trials in which both
parties prefer a judge. In these trials, assume that plaintiffs
believe their chances of winning are 0.8 before a judge and 0.6
before a jury, and defendants believe the opposite-that the
plaintiffs chances are 0.6 before a judge and 0.8 before a jury.
Both parties would prefer a judge, and yet plaintiffs will win
about 70% of judge trials compared to 50% of jury trials.
Alternatively, both parties would choose a judge trial if the
plaintiffs estimates were 0.5 and 0.3 before a judge and jury
respectively, and the defendant's estimates were 0.3 and 0.5
before a judge and jury respectively. Here, plaintiffs might win
an average of 40% of judge trials. Both the 40% and 70% judge
win rates are possible equilibrium outcomes, even though
plaintiffs win 50% of their jury trials.
Sept. 26, 2004) (explaining that "[t]he intersection of two events A and B is the probability
of A and B occurring" and "is written as P(A and B)," which is obtained by dividing the
event by the number of different outcomes, Event/Number of Outcomes).
11. This assumes that each party's choice is independent of the other's choice. This
is unlikely. For example, if the plaintiff observes that the defendant prefers a judge trial,
the plaintiff is likely to believe that the defendant has private information indicating that
the defendant believes he will do better in front of a judge. This is likely to increase the
possibility that the plaintiff chooses a jury trial.
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D. Asymmetric Stakes: The Risk of Invalidity
The preceding analysis ignores a distinguishing feature of
intellectual property litigation-namely, that a plaintiff claiming
that its intellectual property has been infringed risks a court
finding that its intellectual property is invalid. For example, a
patent owner who unsuccessfully sues an alleged infringer may
incur substantial losses if a court also holds that the patent is
invalid. Empirical evidence suggests that this factor imposes a
significant risk on patent holders. For example, in the last
twenty years or so, about 46% of patents have been held invalid
in patent suits that have gone to trial. 3 In contrast, the risk of
invalidity is probably considerably lower for copyrights and
trademarks than for patents, in part, because the absence of data
or discussion suggests that the problem is slight.
There are, however, related risks for copyright and
trademark owners that can impose significant losses if the
plaintiff loses an infringement claim. For example, if a copyright
or trademark holder loses an infringement suit, he may risk
losses in future licensing and other revenues because the adverse
court decision has effectively narrowed the scope of his
intellectual property as well as provided potential licensees with
greater bargaining power.
To incorporate this into the analysis, let a plaintiff who loses
his infringement claim at trial face a probability q (conditional
on losing at trial) that his intellectual property is invalid. We can
rewrite VA as
VA = pAJ-(1-pA)'qL-a (4)
where L denotes A's losses in current and future revenues
if his intellectual property is held invalid. 4 Observe that the
potential loss in intellectual property will reduce the incentive of
A to sue in the first instance. Indeed, L may be so large relative
to J that A will prefer not to sue even if A is very likely to win
12. See Gregory J. Maier & Bradley D. Lytle, The Strategic Use of Means-Plus-
Function Claims, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 241, 246 (1998) (stating that a
patent becomes worthless when it is invalidated).
13. See John R. Allison & Mark Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 185, 205 (1998). The authors also report on
earlier studies that have found higher invalidity rates in periods before the creation of the
Federal Circuit in 1984. Id. at 206 & n.53.
14. The analysis also applies to lost licensing revenues, in which q would denote the
probability that the plaintiffs legal protection for its intellectual property is weakened
and L is the related losses.
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his suit and litigation costs are zero. To illustrate, VA < 0 and A
will not sue B if pA/(1--PA)<qL/J or, in other words, when A's
estimate of the odds of winning at trial is less than the ratio of
A's expected loss qL-if his intellectual property is held
invalid-to the judgment J he receives from a successful
infringement claim. Suppose, for example, qL was nine times
greater than J in a trademark suit-not an unreasonable
assumption for a valuable trademark even if the likelihood of
invalidity q were small-then A would have to believe that he
faced at least a 0.9 probability of prevailing at trial in order to
file a lawsuit. In comparison, if qL = 0 (the typical civil suit) and
a = 0, the plaintiff would file a lawsuit provided the probability of
prevailing were greater than zero, however small.
Now consider the choice between settling and going to trial
assuming VA > 0. The parties will settle before trial if
a+b+(1-pa)qL>(pA -pB )J. Thus, the prospect that the trial
court will invalidate the plaintiffs intellectual property has the
same impact as an increase in the cost of going to trial (i.e., the
cost equivalent of (1-pa)qL), which in turn will reduce the
fraction of cases that go to trial. Note that an increase in this
trial equivalent "cost" will probably be substantial relative to
both the actual cost of litigation and the amount the winning
plaintiff will recover in a trial unless PA is very high. But in that
case, the precedents are likely to be clear and the parties are
unlikely to go to trial because PA - PB will be close to zero or
negative. In short, the threat of invalidity leads to weaker
incentives to file intellectual property than other civil suits and
leads to a smaller proportion of trials among cases that are filed.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The litigation data in my sample come from a database of
about five million civil cases that were terminated in the federal
district courts in the 1978 to 2000 period. In each district court, a
clerk records the subject matter, jurisdictional basis, dates of
filing and termination, method of disposition (e.g., default or
consent judgment, disposal on motion before trial, and jury or
court trial), the winning party, and any judgment (amount
awarded to plaintiff or other relief). The trial data are available
by calendar year for the years 1978 to 2000, but terminations
(dismissals, consent judgments, trials, etc.) are only available by
fiscal years 1987 to 2000.1' The data were gathered by the
15. In the Federal Circuit, the fiscal year ended on June 30 from 1987 to 1991;
however, starting in 1992, the fiscal year ended on September 30. See Analytical Services
Office, Office of Judge Programs, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Table 1.4: U.S.
2004]
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts and are
disseminated by the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research.
16
A. Civil Terminations and Trials
Figure 1 summarizes time series data on trials and
terminations for intellectual property (defined as the sum of
trademark, copyright and patent cases) and all civil cases
(excluding prisoner petitions) in the federal district courts. 7 To
facilitate comparisons among the different series, I have set the
value of each equal to 1 in the base year (1978 for trials and 1987
for terminations).
Two differences between intellectual property and civil
litigation are worth noting. One difference is that since 1978,
intellectual property trials have remained relatively flat
(although trials rose sharply in the 1980s and fell thereafter by
about 1.7% per year), whereas civil trials have declined by more
than 50% (or by more than 4.2% per year and by nearly two-
thirds since 1983).8 The other difference is that terminations of
intellectual property cases increased by about 3% per year, or by
more than 50% since 1987 (the first year the data are available).9
In contrast, civil terminations remained relatively constant (a
0.6% annual increase, which was not significantly different than
zero) in the same time period. °
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Appeals Filed, Terminated, Pending (Mar. 2003)
(showing that the fiscal year ended on June 30 from 1988 to 1991 and on September 30
from 1992 through the present), http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures
/tablel.04.pdf. Thus, the fiscal year 1992 covers fifteen months.
16. The detailed trial data begin in 1978, and civil termination data begin in 1987.
Note also that because the data on trials for 1978 is for six months, we doubled these
values to facilitate comparison with the full years from 1979 to 2000. The data is available
online from Ted Eisenberg at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm (last visited
Sept. 26, 2004).
17. Unless otherwise indicated,. I exclude prisoner petitions from the civil case
category. Prisoner petitions are about 10% of all civil trials and 16% of all civil
terminations. See Eisenberg, supra note 16 (listing prisoner petitions under categories
510 through 555).
18. Refer to Figure 1 infra (showing that IP trial activity has not changed
significantly, whereas civil trial activity has significantly declined).
19. Refer to Figure 1 infra (showing an increase in intellectual property
terminations).
20. Refer to Figure 1 infra (showing essentially no change in civil terminations).
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Figure 2 presents data on the ratio of trials to terminations
from 1987 to 2000.21 The most striking feature of Figure 2 is the
significant drop in the percentage of cases terminated by trials.
For civil cases, the percentage falls from 4.2% to 1.4%, or by 6%
per year, and for intellectual property, the percentage falls from
3.7% to 1.4%, or by 4% per year.22 Notice that the decline in the
ratio of trials to terminations for IP cases results primarily from
the increase in the number of terminations between 1987 and
2000 because the number of trials remains relatively constant.23
In contrast, the decline in the trial ratio for civil cases resulted
primarily from a sharp decline in the number of trials as
terminations remained relatively constant.24
Figure 2 strongly suggests that the significant decline in the
ratio of trials to terminations for intellectual property cases is
part of an overall decline in the fraction of civil cases terminated
by trial. Why this has occurred remains a puzzle. One
explanation is the increase in use of arbitration and mediation to
21. We cannot compute the ratio of trials to terminations before 1987 because it is
the first year of the termination data. Note also that the trial ratio refers to trials in the
fiscal year divided by terminations in the same calendar year.
22. Refer to Figure 2 infra. The difference between -.060 and -.040 is significant at
the .005 level. We estimated the negative growth rates from the regression log Y = a + rt
where Y is either the civil or IP ratio of trials to terminations, t is the year variable, and r
is the rate of decline. The regression coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses) are -.060
(6.43) and -.040 (3.82) for the civil and IP ratios, respectively. Refer to Figure 2 infra.
23. Refer to Figure 1 supra.
24. Refer to Figure 1 supra.
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resolve legal disputes.25 However, if much of the growth in
alternative dispute resolution takes place before a case is filed,
then both terminations and trials would decline, but not
necessarily the percentage of trials. A second possible
explanation is the growth in the number of "meritless" claims
that are brought under several recent federal statutes.26 Because
many of these cases will be dismissed by motion, this would lead
to a decline in the percentage of cases terminated by trials. The
data, however, do not support this claim. 7 One observes
significant declines in the percentage of cases terminated by
trials in well-established areas of law such as contracts, real
property, and antitrust.2 s
Figure 2





.1.9 85> 1990 1 95 2 00
Year
-Intellectual Property - . .--- Civ Cases (ex. prisoner petitions)
Three additional points are worth noting.
1. Intellectual property litigation accounts for a small
fraction of civil litigation in the district courts. For example,
25. ADR Is a Factor in Decreasing Number of Trials, Study Says, DiSP. RESOL. J.,
Feb.-Apr. 2004, at 5 (mentioning the increased use of alternative dispute resolution as a
factor in the decrease in trials and discussing a study by Professor Marc Galanter on the
decrease in federal trials).
26. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 4 (noting several federal statutes
enacted in the 1990s: Visual Artists Rights Acts, Architectural Works Protection Act,
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
27. Refer to Figure 5 infra.
28. The percentage declines from 1987/1988 to 1999/2000 are as follows: 2.73% to
1.28% for contracts; 4.1% to 1.86% for antitrust; and 1.8% to .009% for real property. See
Eisenberg, supra note 16.
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intellectual property cases accounted for about 3.5% (91,784
cases) of total civil terminations (2,738,000 cases) in the 1987 to
2000 time period.29 With respect to civil trials, intellectual
property accounted for 2.7% (4264 trials or an average of 185 per
year) of the 160,583 civil trials in the 1978 to 2000 period. 30
2. Figure 1 aggregates data on trademark, copyright, and
patent litigation into a single intellectual property category,
which conceals differences among types of intellectual property.
Although we explore these differences later, we note here that in
the 1987 to 2000 period, copyright terminations were unchanged,
patent terminations increased by more than 200%, and
trademark terminations increased by 175% compared to a 50%
overall increase in intellectual property terminations.3' As Figure
3 shows, the more rapid the increase in terminations, the greater
the decrease in the percentage of cases terminated by trial-the
percentage declines more rapidly for patents than trademarks,
which, in turn, decline more rapidly than copyrights during the
1987 to 2000 time period.
3. Because an intellectual property owner who brings an
infringement action risks a finding that his trademark,
copyright, or patent is invalid, the economic model predicts that
the percentage of intellectual property cases terminated by trial
will be lower than for all civil cases (all other factors constant).
Overall, the data provide weak support for that prediction. The
average percentage of civil cases terminated by trial in the 1987
to 2000 period is 2.89% compared to 2.62% for intellectual
property cases-1.99% for trademark cases, 1.78% for copyright
cases, and 5.38% for patent cases." Although the lower trial ratio
for trademarks and copyrights is consistent with the litigation
model, the substantially higher ratio for patents is not. One must
interpret these findings cautiously because we have not held
constant differences in litigation cost, legal uncertainty, and
other factors that also influence the percentage of cases
terminated by trial. For example, the establishment of the
specialized court for patent appeals in 1982 probably increased
the amount of legal uncertainty at the appellate level-at least
until the court decided enough cases to build up a stock of
precedents-which would show up in an increase in the
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Refer to Figure 1 supra.
32. The difference between the trial ratio for civil and intellectual property is
significant at the .05 level, and the differences between the ratio for civil and the separate
types of intellectual property are all significant at the .001 level.
2004]
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percentage of patent cases that go to trial. 3 Figure 3 provides
some support for this hypothesis because the difference in the
trial ratio between patent cases and trademark or copyright
cases is greatest in the ten or so years following the
establishment of the patent court and narrows considerably after
1995.
FiguLreS3
RatioBof 1nteectual PropertyTIals toTerminations
Year5 9 1995 200
-A---Trademarks - -- Copyrights
2 s - Patents
B. Intellectual Property Output
We expect that an increase in the underlying activities that
generate intellectual property, which can be roughly proxied by
federal trademark and copyright registrations and patent grants,
is likely to generate an increase in the number of intellectual
property disputes and, ultimately, an increase in litigation in
district courts. A simple comparison of current activity levels and
litigation activity, however, poses two problems. Consider, for
example, the relationship between trademark registrations and
litigation. Data on the number of trademark cases that are
terminated in the district court in year t will depend not just on
recent trademark registrations but also on the total stock of
trademarks, which equals the sum of past annual registrations
appropriately discounted to reflect depreciation. That is, a
trademark registered ten or fifty years ago, or one registered two
33. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created on October 1,
1982. This court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district court in patent
infringement cases. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis
of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (2004).
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years ago, may produce litigation today-although one suspects
that litigation is more likely to arise from recently registered
trademarks in which the scope of legal protection will tend to be
less certain. Second, current registrations will have little
connection to current terminations (as opposed to the filing of
lawsuits) because the time delay between the filing and
34termination of a case often exceeds two years.
It is still worthwhile to look at data on the annual figures on
trademark and copyright registrations and patent grants in the
1978 to 2000 period to get a rough notion of the growth in the
activities that generate intellectual property. Figure 4 shows
substantial growth in activities that, for the most part, exceeded
the growth in real GDP. Trademark registrations more than
tripled and patent grants more than doubled compared to a two-
fold increase in real GDP between 1978 and 2000.3' On the other
hand, copyright registrations doubled from 1978 to 1992 but then
declined by about 25% in the post-1992 period.36 The post-1992
decline in copyright registrations is puzzling because other data
suggest a continued growth after 1992 in copyright producing
activities.37 Logarithmic regressions yielded annual percentage
growth rates (t-statistics in parentheses) of 5.7% (9.9) for
trademark registrations, 1.5% (4.01) for copyright registrations,
4.5% (14.5) for patent grants, and 3.0% (39.1) for real GDP.3" In
comparison, the growth in intellectual property litigation was
significantly less than growth in activities generating intellectual
property. We showed earlier that intellectual property
terminations grew by about 3% per year beginning in 1987,
34. The medium time from filing to termination by trial in a calendar year ranges
420 to 696 days (with a medium of 555 days) for the 1978-2000 period for trademarks;
434 to 993 days (with a medium of 680 days) for copyright; 658 to 1839 days (with a
medium of 1006) for patents; and 542 to 641 (with a medium of 651 days) for all civil
trials (excluding prisoner petitions). Eisenberg, supra note 16. I have not yet analyzed
some scattered data on the delay from filing to termination, including cases that are
terminated without a trial.
35. Refer to Figure 4 infra.
36. Refer to Figure 4 infra.
37. For example, data on annual real recreation expenditures (in which
expenditures on music, movies, books, and periodicals account for 50% of the total)
increased just as rapidly in the post-1992 as the 1978 to 1991 time period. See William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,
504, 508 n.63 (2003). One factor that does not appear to contribute to this decline is the
amendment to the Copyright Act in 1992 that made copyright renewals automatic. Id. at
512-13. We observe the same post-1992 decline in registrations in Figure 4 when renewal
registrations are excluded. One factor that explains part of the post-1992 decline in
registrations was the increase in 1991 of the registration fee from $10 to $20. Id. at 499.
38. All two-way comparisons of growth rates are statistically significant at the .001
level except for the difference between the trademark and patent growth rates in which
the difference is significant at the .10 level.
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although trials remained relatively constant during the 1978 to
2000 period.
FiguLre 4
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C. The Growth in the Legal Protection of Intellectual Property
Other things constant, an expansion in intellectual property
protection is likely to increase the number of legal claims that
allege violations of these expanded rights. Thus, an increase in
the legal protection of intellectual property should generate
increased litigation in trademarks, copyrights, and patents. It is
undisputed that intellectual property protection has grown in the
last fifty years or so, particularly since the passage of the 1976
Copyright Act.39 In a recent paper, Richard Posner and I
estimated the expansion in intellectual property rights by the
increase in the number of words in the principal intellectual
property statutes, because most of those statutes expand
intellectual property rights-or create new ones-rather than
reduce existing rights.4 ° In the 1946 to 2000 period, Posner and I
estimated that the copyright statute increased by nearly eleven-
fold (from 11,550 words in 1946 to 124,300 words in 2000); the
patent statute increased by more than four-fold (from 24,565
words in 1946 to 110,880 in 2000); and the trademark statute
39. Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000)); see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 1 (much of this
section comes from this paper); see also Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the
Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 886-87 (1997) (expounding on the expansion of
protection for copyright owners).
40. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 2.
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(the Lanham Act)4' by more than two-fold (from 10,640 words in
1946 to 24,750 words in 2000).42 This translates into a 4.4%
annual rate of growth for the copyright statute; a 2.9% rate for
the patent statute; and a 1.4% rate for the trademark statute.43
We also showed that these increases were not continuous, but
typically coincided with major statutory changes, such as the new
Copyright Act in 1976, the Trademark Revision Act in 1988, and
amendments to the Copyright Act in 1998 concerning digital
copying and the copyright term.
As Figure 5 shows, if we restrict the data to the 1978 to 2000
period (the period that covers the litigation data and which
comes after the rapid growth in words associated with the 1976
Copyright Act), the annual rates of growth are about the same for
the three statutes: 3.9% for the number of words in the Lanham
Act; 3.1% for the copyright act; and 2.9% for the patent act. 5
41. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2000)).
42. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 2.
43. Id. A regression of the logarithm of words on time yielded annual rates of
growth (t-ratios in parentheses) in the 1946-2000 period of 0.044 (21.7) for copyrights,
0.014 (11.63) for trademarks, and 0.029 (23.54) for patents. All the differences in these
growth rates are highly significant.
44. Id.
A related indicator of the recent expansion in intellectual property
protection is the number of new laws and amendments enacted in the
approximate quarter century since the Copyright Act of 1976, the first major
revision of the copyright laws in the United States in nearly seventy years. The
act added unpublished works to the category of covered works (thereby
preempting common law copyright), significantly lengthened the copyright term,
and added numerous provisions specifying the scope of protection for particular
categories of work. The 1980s saw provisions added to deal with record rentals,
semiconductors, and satellite transmissions, and to relax various formalities
regarding notice and filing in order to bring our copyright law into compliance
with the Berne Convention.
Trademark law also expanded in the 1980s. The Trademark Revision Act
of 1988 created "an intent to use" system for registration that altered the
longstanding principle that a trademark must be used in commerce before the
owner can apply for registration. Yet, at the same time, the act weakened
trademark protection by requiring that the use (which is required for actual
registration, as distinct from the application for registration, the date of which
would establish priority in a trademark dispute) be commercially significant and
not merely a token use.
The most significant change in the patent area was the creation in 1982 of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to be the exclusive patent
appellate court, in the expectation (about which more later) that it would
interpret and apply the patent statute in a way that would strengthen inventors'
rights.
Id. at 3-4.
45. These annual rates were estimated from regressions of the log of words on time.
All three regression coefficients are statistically significant at the .001 level. We also
reject the hypothesis that the three growth rates are not significantly different from each
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Figure 5 implies that (all other factors constant) we should
observe significant growth in trademark, copyright, and patent
litigation, and slightly higher growth rates for trademarks than
either copyright or patents. The data does not support these
hypotheses. The estimated annual growth rates in trials from
1978 to 2000 were all negative (-.027 for trademarks, -.004 for
copyrights, and -.005 for patents), although only the trademark
growth rate is statistically significant. Terminations in the 1987
to 2000 period increased at annual rates of 5.8% for patents, 3.3%
for trademarks, and .001% for copyrights.
D. Regression Analysis
Regression analysis allows us to examine more rigorously
the relationship between intellectual property litigation and
several variables that are proxies for the factors discussed above.
We present regressions on trials46 and terminations4" for
trademarks, copyrights, and patents separately of the following
specification:
Y = a + bY-1 +b 2 ACT-z +b 3X-z + b4CIV +u,
other. In particular, the higher growth rate for the number of words in the trademark
statutes is significantly greater than either the growth rate of words in the copyright or
patent statutes at the .002 level.
46. Refer to Table 1 infra.
47. Refer to Table 2 infra.
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where Y, denotes either trials or terminations in year t, Y_1
the value of Y lagged one year, ACT_2 the underlying activity
(e.g., trademark registrations), and W 2 the number of words in
the relevant statute (in which an increase in W should reflect an
expansion in property rights and legal uncertainty until the
sufficient precedents interpreting the statute have developed)
lagged two years, CIV equals the number of civil trials or
terminations in year t, and u, denotes the residual term. Notice
that the ACT and W variables are lagged two years to
correspond to the average delay between filing and termination.
We include civil trials or terminations as an independent
variable in order to hold constant factors that are common to
both civil and intellectual property litigation (e.g., an overall
increase in the costs of going to trial relative to the costs of
settling should reduce the number of cases filed, terminated, and
tried). All variables are in log form so that the regression
coefficients measure elasticities-the percent change in the
dependent variable for a 1% change in the independent variable.
The purpose of including the lagged value of the dependent
variable as an independent variable in equation (5) is as follows.
The litigation model predicts that Y, will depend on the
underlying activity ACT in periods t-2, t-3, t-4, and so on,
and therefore that Y,_ will also depend on ACT in periods t-3,
t -4, and so on. We can now substitute Y, for past values of
ACT into the original regression equation, which reduces the
number of independent variables (because Y, substitutes for
activity levels in period t -3 and beyond) and still captures the
relationship between current litigation and the stock of the
underlying activity.
The preliminary results in Table 1 are inconclusive. With
the exception of patent trials, none of the independent variables
is statistically significant in Table 1. In the patent regression, the
coefficients on civil trials and the number of words in the patent
statute are both significant at the .05 level. Although lagged
trials has a positive elasticity in the trademark, copyright, and
patent regressions-indicating that a 10% increase in the
number of trials last year increases the number this year by
about 3%-and the coefficients are greater than the standard





Regression Analysis of Trials:
1978-2000
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Log Trials in Year t
Independent Trademark Copyright PatentVariables
Log Activity,2  -. 15 (0.77) -.07 (0.20) -.06 (0.16)
Log Trials,, .29 (1.31) .31 (1.65) .26 (1.14)
Log Civil Trials, .14 (0.33) .30 (0.70) .78 (2.06)
Log Words,2  -.29 (0.57) .11 (0.17) 1.13 (2.95)
Constant 6.10 (0.69) 2.01 (0.49) -15.6 (1.69)
R2  .53 .30 .36
n 22 22 22
Notes: (1) The lagged activity trial and word variables are specific to
the intellectual property specified in the dependent variable (i.e., in
the trademark regression the activity, trial, and words variables are
lagged trademark registrations, lagged trademark trials, and lagged
words in the Lanham Act); (2) The R 2 is adjusted for the degrees of
freedom (equal to number of observations minus number of
independent variables minus 1); (3) n is the number of observations
in the regression.
The results are somewhat stronger for terminations in
Table 2. Lagged terminations, both for the relevant intellectual
property terminations and for civil terminations in general, are
positive and significant in the trademark and patent regressions.
Past trademark registrations are also a significant determinant
of trademark terminations. Notice that the number of words in
the relevant statutes is insignificant in all equations (though it is
marginally significant and positive in the patent equation).
Overall, the variables account for 90% (the adjusted R 2) of the
variation in trademark and patent terminations.48
48. One should be extremely cautious about reaching any conclusions from Table 2




Regression Analysis of Terminations: 1987-2000
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Log Terminations in Year t
Independent Trademark Copyright Patent
Variables
Log Activity,, .35 (3.09) .59 (1.32) .14 (0.57)
Log Term,, .45 (2.86) .47 (1.25) .52 (2.72)
Log Civil Termt  .63 (3.68) .06 (0.20) .84 (4.58)
Log Wordst.2  -.06 (0.46) -.01 (0.07) .43 (1.39)
Constant -6.52 (2.90) -4.33 (0.46) -13.14 (4.07)
R2  .89 .03 .91
n 13 13 13
Notes: (1) The lagged activity, termination, and word variables are
specific to the intellectual property specified in the dependent
variable (i.e., in the trademark regression the activity, termination,
and word variables are lagged trademark registrations, lagged
trademark termination, and lagged words in the Lanham Act); (2)
The R' is adjusted for the degrees of freedom (equal to number of
observations minus number of independent variables minus 1); (3) n
is the number of observations in the regression.
E. Other Factors that Influence Litigation
This section looks at several additional factors that bear on
intellectual property litigation.
1. Time from Filing to Disposition. The economic model of
litigation implies that an increase in waiting time between filing
and trial will reduce the expected value to A of filing a lawsuit"
because A's litigation costs are likely to be greater- A will incur
costs to maintain his lawsuit over a longer period of time-and
the present value of J will be lower as a trial is pushed further
into the future. The reduction in VA, in turn, should reduce the
number of suits that are filed.
The impact of increased delay on the proportion of cases that
go to trial is less clear. Although delay reduces the minimum
offer the plaintiff will accept to settle, it also reduces the
maximum amount the defendant will pay to settle, assuming the
49. Refer to equation (1) supra.
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defendant gains from having to pay a judgment at a later date.
As a first approximation, the proportion of cases that go to trial
will not change if A's minimum acceptance amount and B's
maximum offer fall at the same amount and there is no change in
litigation costs a and b. More likely, however, delay will
increase both the plaintiff and the defendant's costs. Not only
will delay increase A's cost of maintaining his legal claim, but it
also increases B's cost to the extent his reputation or access to
the capital markets are adversely affected by the prospect of an
unresolved lawsuit over a longer period of time. This implies that
an increase in delay will decrease the proportion of cases that go
to trial. 0
Figure 6 indicates that the delay has been relatively constant
in the federal district courts during the 1978 to 2000 period.51 The
mean time from filing to termination by trial is 723 days for all civil
trials, 657 days for trademark trials, 709 for copyright trials, and
1170 for patent trials. The relative stability of delay implies that
delay cannot account for the significant decline in the percentages of
cases terminated by trial in the 1987 to 2000 period. 2
,Fig ure 6
Medium Days from Filng to Termiation by Trial
6 Trademark Trials H Co'pyright lTrials
---- Patent Trials -- R 1
50. Because delay reduces the value of J, it also tends to reduce the likelihood of a
trial for any given degree of mutual optimism.
51. The one exception is patent cases where delay has fallen from a high of 1,834
days in 1978 to a low of 658 days in 1997. Note, however, that the percent of patent cases
terminated by trial has fallen more rapidly (not less as might be expected) than the
comparable percentages for trademarks and copyrights. Refer to Figure 3 supra.
52. Refer to Figures 2 & 3 supra.
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2. The Plaintiffs Win Rate. As the probability that the
plaintiff will win at trial and the expected value of the lawsuit
rise (VA in equation (1)), so does the probability that the plaintiff
will file a lawsuit. Recall that mutual optimism, PA - PB > 0, is a
necessary condition for a trial to take place. As a first
approximation, therefore, an increase in the plaintiffs win rate
will not affect the likelihood of a trial, which depends on the
difference in the plaintiffs and defendant's estimate of the win
rate, not the win rate itself. Table 3 presents data on the
plaintiffs win rate at trial (fraction of trials in which the plaintiff
prevails at trial) in the 1978 to 2000 period.
Table 3
Plaintiff Win Rate at Trial: 1978-2000
1978-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000 All Years
.67 .67 .64 .67 .67(564) (347) (242) (311) (1,464)
Copyright .73 .74 .71 .74 .73(289) (236) (165) (239) (929)
Patent .49 .57 .65 .57 .56(603) (396) (394) (478) (1,871)
.48 .49 .48 .45 .48(63,148) (41,241) (28,687) (27,507) (160,583)
Note: (1) Plaintiffs win rate is a weighted average of proportion of
trials plaintiff wins, weighted by the number of trials. (2) Numbers in
parentheses are the number of trials. Note that the number of trials
actually used to calculate the win rate is about 80% of all trials.
Table 3 shows that win rates have been relatively constant
for a twenty year period with the exception of patents in which
there was a significant increase in win rate (nearly 20% after the
creation of the patent court). For the full 1978 to 2000 period-
the last column of Table 3-the win rate is highest for copyright,
second highest for trademarks, third highest for patents, and
lowest for all civil cases. Moreover, the differences in mean win
rates among categories are statistically significant. Overall,
intellectual property plaintiffs do better than plaintiffs in civil
litigation, in which the win rate is just under 50%.
The litigation model suggests an explanation that ties
together the higher win rate for plaintiffs in intellectual property
trials than civil trials and the smaller proportion of intellectual
2004]
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property cases compared to civil cases that are terminated by
trial.53 Recall that an intellectual property plaintiff risks an
invalidity finding in the event the plaintiff loses at trial. Because
the trial stakes are asymmetric-the plaintiff has more at stake
than the defendant-there will be selection bias in intellectual
property cases that go to trial. The intellectual property cases
that go to trial are likely to have higher win rates on average
than all civil trials because a higher threshold probability is
required to offset the loss from an invalidity finding. In short, the
litigation model predicts-and we observe-a higher win rate for
intellectual property trials and a lower proportion of
terminations by trial.
3. Jury vs. Judge Trials. The economic model of litigation
predicted that, all other factors constant, jury trials would
account for about 75% and judge trials the remaining 25% of all
trials. The model also predicted that in equilibrium the
probability the plaintiff will prevail at trial (the win rate) will be
the same for jury and judge trials.
In our sample, the percentage of jury trials is significantly
lower than the predicted 75%. The percentages over the 1978 to
2000 time period are 49.4% for civil trials, 40.4% for patent trials,
27.7% for copyright trials, and 24.6% for trademark trials. 4
Figure 7 also indicates that jury trials, as a percentage of all
trials, have been growing on average between 1% and 2% per
year, although recent percentages are still below 75%.55 The most
obvious explanation for why jury trials are less than 75% of trials
is that jury trials are more costly to the parties than judge
trials." If cost considerations lead each party to prefer a judge
trial 70% (as opposed to 50%) of the time, jury trials would
comprise about 50% of all trials.
53. This holds for copyrights and trademarks, but not for patents because the
percentage of terminations by trials was significantly higher in this category than for civil
terminations. We noted earlier that the higher trial ratio for patents is not unexpected
because the creation of the patent court in 1982 is likely to have initially diminished the
stock of precedents and added to legal uncertainty. Refer to Part I.A supra.
54. All two-way differences are statistically significant except for the difference
between the proportion of jury trials for copyrights and trademarks.
55. The rates of growth (t-statistics in parentheses) in regressions of the form
Y = ae" are .016 (21.06) for civil trials, .024 (11.16) for patents, .016 (7.97) for trademarks,
and .012 (4.78) for copyrights.
56. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 598-99.
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Although we have no direct cost data in our sample on jury and
judge trials, jury trials tend to be more costly because they are more
cumbersome and take longer to complete from start to finish." On
the other hand, the results in Table 4 are inconclusive. The average
time from filing to disposition (which differs from the actual trial
time) is significantly greater for judge than jury trials in the patent
and all civil case categories, significantly lower for judge than jury








Mean Days from Filing to Termination by Trial
for Judge and Jury Trials:
1978-2000
Jury Trials Judge Trials Judge + Jury
Trademark 732 633 656(340) (1095) (1,435)
Copyright 713 704 706(254) (663) (917)
Patent 950 1275 1162(741) (1095) (1,836)
All Civil Trials 694 753 725(75,931) (80,966) (156,897)
The economic model also predicted that win rates in jury and
judge trials should be the same-in equilibrium there would be
no net advantage to a plaintiff or defendant from a jury compared
to a judge trial; otherwise, the favored party would opt for a jury
trial and we would not have any judge trials. With the exception
of patent trials, the results in Table 5 strongly confirm the equal
win rate hypothesis-the difference between the win rate in jury
and judge trials is statistically insignificant in all categories but
patents. Table 5 shows that plaintiffs are significantly more
likely to win in front of a jury than judge. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Figure 7 showed that the fraction of jury trials as a
percentage of all trials is significantly higher for patents than
copyrights or trademarks.
Table 5
Plaintiff Win Rate in Judge and Jury Trials: 1978-2000
Jury Trials Judge Trials Judge + Jury
Trademark .63 .68 .67
Copyright .70 .74 .73
Patent .65 .50 .56




In this paper, I applied the economic model of litigation to
two puzzling features of intellectual property litigation. The first
is the small increase in intellectual property litigation over the
last twenty-five years or so while, at the same time, there has
been rapid growth in both the output and legal protection of
intellectual property. The second is that the number of
intellectual property trials has fallen sharply as a percentage of
intellectual property cases terminated from roughly 3.5% to 1.5%
in the 1978 to 2000 period. These observations are mirrored in
the overall trends in civil litigation in the federal courts-
terminations have been relatively flat and trials have declined
sharply. This suggests that there are factors common to both
intellectual property and civil litigation taken as a whole that are
likely to be important determinants of intellectual property
litigation-in particular, the increase in use of arbitration and
mediation to resolve legal disputes.
The paper also explores empirical features of the litigation
process itself that may bear on changes in trademark, copyright,
and patent litigation considered separately. These include the
following:
1. The decline in the percentage of cases terminated by trial
has been greater for patents than copyrights or trademarks. The
data also indicate a sharp decline in the trial/termination ratio
for patents in the 1997 to 2000 period. The Supreme Court's 1996
Markman decision may have played a role in this decline.59
2. The economic model of litigation suggests that an increase
in court delay tends to reduce the number of cases filed and
litigated through trial. Trial delay (as measured by the time from
filing to disposition by trial), however, has been relatively
constant in the federal district courts during the 1978 to 2000
period, and thus does not explain changes in intellectual property
litigation.
3. Plaintiff win rates have been relatively constant over the
1978 to 2000 period with the exception of patents, which
experienced a significant increase in the win rate (nearly 20%
after the creation of the patent court). Overall, intellectual
property plaintiffs win about 60% to 70% of trials compared to
just under 50% for all civil litigation.
4. The percentage of jury trials over the 1978 to 2000 time
59. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (recognizing that
interpreting the construction of a patent and defining terms of art is exclusively within
the province of the court).
2004] 775
776 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [41:3
period are 49.4% for civil trials compared to 40.4% for patent
trials, 27.7% for copyright trials, and 24.6% for trademark trials.
The most obvious explanation for why jury trials are less than
75% of trials (the predicted value if plaintiffs on average do as
well in front of juries as judges) is that jury trials are more costly
to the parties than judge trials.
